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Abstract. Modular deductive verification is a powerful technique ca-
pable to show that each function in a program satisfies its contract.
However, function contracts do not provide a global view of which high-
level (e.g. security-related) properties of a whole software module are
actually established, making it very difficult to assess them. To address
this issue, this paper proposes a new specification mechanism, called
meta-properties. A meta-property can be seen as an enhanced global in-
variant specified for a set of functions, and capable to express predicates
on values of variables, as well as memory related conditions (such as
separation) and read or write access constraints. We also propose an au-
tomatic transformation technique translating meta-properties into usual
contracts and assertions, that can be proved by traditional deductive ver-
ification tools. This technique has been implemented as a Frama-C plugin
called MetAcsl and successfully applied to specify and prove safety- and
security-related meta-properties in two illustrative case studies.
1 Introduction
Modular deductive verification is a well-known technique [1] for formally prov-
ing that a program respects some user-defined properties. It consists in providing
for each function of the program a contract, which basically contains a precon-
dition describing what the function expects from its callers, and a postcondition
indicating what it guarantees when it successfully returns. Logical formulas,
known as verification conditions or proof obligations (POs), can then be gener-
ated and given to automated theorem provers. If all POs are validated, the body
of the function fulfills its contract. Many deductive verification frameworks exist
for various programming and formal specification languages. We focus here on
Frama-C [2] and its deductive verification plugin Wp, which allows proving a
C program correct with respect to a formal specification expressed in ACSL [2].
However, encoding high-level properties spanning across the entire program
in a set of Pre/Post-based contracts is not always immediate. In the end, such
high-level properties get split among many different clauses in several contracts,
without an explicit link between them. Therefore, even if each individual clause
is formally proved, it might be very difficult for a verification engineer, a code
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2reviewer or a certification authority to convince themselves that the provided
contracts indeed ensure the expected high-level properties. Moreover, a software
product frequently evolves during its lifetime, leading to numerous modifications
in the code and specifications. Maintaining a high-level (e.g. security-related)
property is extremely complex without a suitable mechanism to formally specify
and automatically verify it after each update.
The purpose of the present work is to propose such a specification mecha-
nism for high-level properties, which we call meta-properties, and to allow their
automatic verification on C code in Frama-C thanks to a new plugin called
MetAcsl.
Motivation This work was motivated by several previous projects. During the
verification of a hypervisor, we observed the need for a mechanism of specifica-
tion and automatic verification of high-level properties, in particular, for global
properties related to isolation and memory separation. Isolation properties are
known as key properties in many verification projects, in particular, for hyper-
visors and micro-kernels [3].
A similar need for specific high-level properties recently arose from a case
study on a confidentiality-oriented page management system submitted by an
industrial partner. In this example, each page and each user (process) are given
a confidentiality level, and we wish to specify and verify that in particular:
– (Pread) a user cannot read data from a page with a confidentiality level higher
than its own;
– (Pwrite) a user cannot write data to a page with a confidentialtiy level lower
than its own.
This case study will be used as a running example in this paper. As a second
case study (also verified, but not detailed in this paper), we consider a simple
smart house manager with several interesting properties such as: “a door can
only be unlocked after a proper authentication or in case of alarm” or “whenever
the alarm is ringing, all doors must be unlocked”. Again, these examples involve
properties that are hard to express with function contracts since they apply to
the entire program rather than a specific function.1
Contributions The contributions of this paper2 include:
– a new form of high-level properties, which we call meta-properties, and an
extension of the ACSL language able to express them (Sect. 2),
– a set of code transformations to translate meta-properties into native ACSL
annotations that can be proved via the usual methods (Sect. 3),
– a Frama-C plugin MetAcsl able to parse C code annotated with meta-
properties and to perform the aforementioned code transformations (Sect. 4),
– a case study: a confidentiality-oriented page system, where important se-
curity guarantees were expressed using meta-properties and automatically
verified thanks to the code transformation with MetAcsl (Sect. 4).
1 These examples are publicly available at https://huit.re/metacas.
2 A longer version is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.10509
3
1 struct Page { //Page handler structure
2 char* data; //First address of the page
3 enum allocation status; // ALLOCATED or FREE (ensured by M1, lines 10-12)
4 enum confidentiality level; /*Page level , CONFIDENTIAL or PUBLIC */ }
5 enum confidentiality user_level; // Current user process level
6 struct Page metadata[PAGE_NB ]; //All pages
7 struct Page* page_alloc(void); // Allocates a page
8 void page_read(struct Page*, char* buffer); // Reads a page
9 void page_encrypt(struct Page*); // Encrypts a page in place , makes it PUBLIC
10 /*@ meta M1: ∀function f; \strong_invariant(f),
11 ∀ int page; 0 ≤ page < PAGE_NB ⇒
12 metadata[page]. status == FREE ∨ metadata[page]. status == ALLOCATED;
13 meta M2: ∀function f; //Only page_encrypt can change levels of allocated
pages
14 ! \subset(f, {page_encrypt }) ⇒ \writing(f),
15 ∀ int page; 0 ≤ page < PAGE_NB ∧ metadata[page]. status == ALLOCATED
16 ⇒ \separated(\written , &metadata[page].level);
17 meta M3: ∀function f; \reading(f), // Ensures Pread
18 ∀ int page; 0 ≤ page < PAGE_NB ∧ metadata[page]. status == ALLOCATED
19 ∧ user_level == PUBLIC ∧ metadata[page]. level == CONFIDENTIAL
20 ⇒ \separated(\read , metadata[page].data + (0 .. PAGE_LENGTH - 1));
21 */ //Meta -property ensuring Pwrite is defined similarly to M3
Fig. 1: Partial meta-specification of a confidentiality case study
2 Specification of Meta-properties
A meta-property is a property meant to express high-level requirements. As such,
it is not attached to any particular function but instead to a set of functions. It
is thus defined in the global scope and can only refer to global objects.
To define a meta-property, the user must provide (i) the set of functions it
will be applied to, (ii) a property (expressed in ACSL) and (iii) the context, i.e. a
characterization of the situations in which they want the property to hold in each
of these functions (everywhere in the function, only at the beginning and the
end, upon writing in a variable, etc.). Furthermore, depending on the context,
the property can refer to some special variables which we call meta-variables.
Figure 1 features a few examples of meta-properties further explained below.
Let F denote the set of functions defined in the current program, and P
the set of native ACSL properties. Formally, we can define a meta-property as
a triple (c, F, P ), where c is a context (see Sect. 2.2), F ⊆ F and P ∈ P.
Intuitively, we can interpret this triple as “∀f ∈ F , P holds for f in the context
c”. For the meta-property to be well-formed, P must be a property over a subset
of G ∪M(c), where G is the set of variables available in the global scope of the
program andM(c) is the set of meta-variables provided by the context c.
The actual MetAcsl syntax for defining a meta-property (c, F, P ) is
meta [specification of F] c, P; An example is given by property M1 (cf.
lines 10–12 in Figure 1), where F = F , c = strong_invariant and P is the
predicate stating that the status of any page should be either FREE or ALLOCATED.
2.1 Target Functions and Quantification
Meta-properties are applied to a given target set of functions F defined as F =
F+\F− by providing explicit lists of considered and excluded functions F+, F− ⊆
F . If not provided, F+ and F− are respectively equal to F and ∅ by default, i.e.
the meta-property should hold for all functions of the program. F− is useful
when the user wants to target every function except a few, since they do not
have to explicitly provide every resulting target function.
4The MetAcsl syntax for the specification of F uses the built-in ACSL con-
struction \forall, possibly followed by \subset with or without logic negation
! (to express f ∈ F+ and f /∈ F−). It can be observed in property M2 (lines
13–16), where F+ = F and F− = {page_encrypt} excludes only one function.
2.2 Notion of Context
The context c of a meta-property defines the states in which property P must
hold, and may introduce meta-variables that can be used in the definition of P .
Beginning/Ending Context (Weak Invariant) A weak invariant indicates that P
must hold at the beginning and at the end of each target function f ∈ F .
Everywhere Context (Strong invariant) A strong invariant is similar to a weak
invariant, except that it ensures that P holds at every point 3 of each target
function. For example, propertyM1 specifies that at every point of the program,
the status of any page must be either FREE or ALLOCATED.
Writing Context This ensures that P holds upon any modification of the memory
(both stack and heap). It provides a meta-variable \written that refers to the
variable (and, more generally, the memory location) being written to.
A simple usage of this context can be to forbid any direct modification of some
global variable, as in property M2. This property states that for any function
that is not page_encrypt, the left-hand side of any assignment must be separated
from (that is, disjoint with) the global variable metadata[page].level for any
page with the ALLOCATED status. In other words, only the page_encrypt function
is allowed to modify the confidentiality level of an allocated page.
An important benefit of this setting is a non-transitive restriction of modifi-
cations that cannot be specified using the ACSL clause assigns, since the latter
is transitive over function calls and necessarily permits to modify a variable when
at least one callee has the right to modify it. Here, since we only focus on direct
modifications, a call to page_encrypt (setting to public the level of the page it
has encrypted) from another function does not violate meta-property M2.
Furthermore, modification can be forbidden under some condition (i.e. that
the page is allocated), while assigns has no such mechanism readily available.
Reading Context Similar to the writing context, this ensures that the property
holds whenever some memory location is read, and provides a meta-variable
\read referring to the read location. It is used in property M3 (lines 17–20),
which expresses the guarantee Pread of the case study (see Sec. 1) by imposing
a separation of a read location and the contents of allocated confidential pages
when the user does not have sufficient access rights. As another example, an
isolation of a page can be specified as separation of all reads and writes from it.
These few simple contexts, combined with the native features of ACSL, turn
out to be powerful enough to express quite interesting properties, including mem-
ory isolation and all properties used in our two motivating case studies.
3 More precisely, every sequence point as defined by the C standard.
53 Verification of Meta-properties
Figure 2 shows an (incorrect) toy implementation of two functions of Figure 1
that we will use to illustrate the verification of meta-properties M1–M3.
The key idea of the verification is the translation of meta-properties into
native ACSL annotations, which are then verified using existing Frama-C ana-
lyzers. To that end, the property P of a meta-property (c, F, P ) must be inserted
as an assertion in relevant locations (as specified by context c) in each target
function f ∈ F , and the meta-variables (if any) must be instantiated.
1 struct Page* page_alloc () {
2 //try to find a free page
3 struct Page* fp = find_free_page ();
4 //if a free page is found ,
5 // allocate it with current user
level
6 if(fp 6= NULL) {
7 fp ->status = ALLOCATED;
8 fp ->level = user_level;
9 }
10 return fp;
11 }
12 void page_read(struct Page* from ,
char* buffer) {
13 for(i∈ N = 0 ; i < PAGE_LENGTH ;
++i)
14 buffer[i] = from ->data[i];
15 }
Fig. 2: Incorrect code w.r.t. M2 and M3
We define a specific translation
for each context. For weak invariants,
property P is simply added as both
a precondition and a postcondition in
the contract of f . This is also done
for the strong invariant, for which
P is additionally inserted after each
instruction potentially modifying the
values of the free variables in P 4 For
example, Figure 3a shows the transla-
tion of M1 on page_alloc. Our prop-
erty (defined on lines 11–12 in Fig-
ure 1, denoted PM1 here) is inserted
after the modification of a status
field (line 6) since the property in-
volves these objects, but not after the modification of a level field (line 8).
For Writing (resp. Reading) contexts, P is inserted before any instruction
potentially making a write (resp. read) access to the memory, with the exception
of function calls. In addition, each meta-variable is replaced by its actual value.
For example, in the translation ofM2 on page_alloc (Figure 3b), the property is
inserted before the two modifications of fp, and \written is replaced respectively
by fp->status and fp->level. In this case M2 does not hold. While its first
instantiation (lines 4–6) is easily proved, it is not the case for the second one
(lines 8–10). Indeed, there exists a page (the one being modified) that has a
status set to ALLOCATED because of the previous instruction (line 7) and for which
the \separated clause is obviously false. Hence, the assertion fails, meaning that
the whole meta-propertyM2 cannot be proved. The fix consists in swapping lines
6 and 7 in Figure 2. After that, all assertions generated from M2 are proved.
A similar transformation for M3 on page_read shows that the proof fails
since the implementation allows an agent to read from any page without any
check. Adding proper guards allows the meta-property to be proved. Conversely,
if a meta-property is broken by an erroneous code update, a proof failure after
automatically re-running MetAcsl helps to easily detect it.
4 The AST is normalized so that every memory modification happens through an
assignment. Then we conservatively determine if the object being assigned is one of
the free variables of P : in presence of pointers, we assume the worst case.
61 /*@ requires PM1;
2 ensures PM1; */
3 struct Page* page_alloc () {
4 struct Page* fp =
find_free_page ();
5 if(fp 6= NULL) {
6 fp ->status = ALLOCATED;
7 /*@ assert PM1;*/
8 fp ->level = user_level;
9 //Line 8 cannot break PM1
10 }
11 } (a) Transformation for M1
1 struct Page* page_alloc () {
2 struct Page* fp = find_free_page ();
3 if(fp 6= NULL) {
4 /*@ assert ∀ int page; 0 ≤ page < PAGE_NB
5 ⇒ metadata[page]. status == ALLOCATED
6 ⇒ \separated(fp ->status ,
&metadata[page].level);*/
7 fp->status = PAGE_ALLOCATED;
8 /*@ assert ∀ int page; 0 ≤ page < PAGE_NB
9 ⇒ metadata[page]. status == ALLOCATED
10 ⇒ \separated(fp ->level ,
&metadata[page].level);*/
11 fp->level = user_level;
12 }
13 }
(b) Transformation for M2
Fig. 3: Examples of code transformations for functions of Figure 2
This verification technique is related to [4] as we generate annotations whose
verification implies the validity of a high-level property. However their specified
properties are in the form of pre-/post-conditions on core functions that are then
propagated throughout the code, while we define properties that are not always
pertaining to some core functions and use a simpler propagation method.
4 Results on Case Studies and Conclusion
Experiments The support of meta-properties and the proposed methodology
for their verification were fully implemented in OCaml as a Frama-C plugin
called MetAcsl. We realized a simple implementation of the two case studies
mentioned in Sect. 1) and were able to fully specify and automatically verify all
aforementioned properties (in particular Pread and Pwrite) using MetAcsl. The
transformation step is performed in less than a second while the automatic proof
takes generally less than a minute.
Conclusion We proposed a new specification mechanism for high-level properties
in Frama-C, as well as an automatic transformation-based technique to verify
these properties by a usual deductive verification approach. . Meta-properties
provide a useful extension to function contracts offering the possibility to ex-
press a variety of high-level safety- and security-related properties, including e.g.
memory isolation and confidentiality. They also provide a verification engineer
with an explicit global view of high-level properties being really proved, avoiding
the risk to miss some part of an implicit property which is not formally linked
to relevant parts of several function contracts, thus facilitating code review and
certification. Another benefit of the new mechanism is the possibility to easily
re-execute a proof after a code update, diminishing the risk of making invalid an
implicit high-level property spanned over several contracts. Initial experiments
confirm the interest of the proposed solution.
Future Work We plan to establish a formal soundness proof for our transfor-
mation technique, thereby allowing MetAcsl to be reliably used for critical
code verification. Moreover, we wish to refine the transformation technique in
order to allow the proof of the generated specification to scale better when the
number of meta-properties or the size of the code increases. Other future work
directions include further experiments to evaluate the proposed approach on
real-life software and for more complex properties.
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